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Cloning and Stem Cell Debates in the Context of Genetic
Determinism
Jane Maienschein*
When I studied introductory biology at the newly-coeducated Yale in the
early 1970s, we didn't hear anything about stem cells. For that matter, we heard
relatively little about embryos and development and much more about genetics
and cell biology. The impression given was that cells are complex, they divide
and multiply, and together they make up organisms. What seemed to matter
most, however, were the genes, the nucleus, and to some extent the ways that
genes cause the cells to act. Led by cell biologist J.P. Trinkaus, our course placed
more emphasis on the interactions of cells than most courses of the time, but cell-
cell interaction was not the central theme.
In biology generally, and certainly in the public mind, the "central dogma"
of genetics had already taken hold and has only gained strength since. The
message was that understanding biology must start with DNA, RNA, and their
actions in producing proteins. Genes direct cells to develop, differentiate, and
divide. Understanding development must start with the first cell, the egg cell, as
it undergoes meiosis and casts off half its chromosomes in preparation for the
fertilization process. Each cell division brings expression of different genes, and
expression of these genes causes all the organic processes. And so it goes. Genes
are inherited and they drive development; what follows is caused by heredity, or
the doctrine of genetic determinism.
Or so it has seemed since DNA and genetics assumed a core place in biology
in the 1960s and 1970s. What had been called embryology, or the study of
embryos, became known instead as developmental biology and developmental
genetics. The older emphasis on morphogenesis, differentiation, and cellular
changes took a back seat to presumptions of genetic determinism as the cause of
those developmental processes. My contention is that this emphasis on genetic
determinism has reinforced a popular misconception that what matters about the
life of an individual organism, including its form and function, is laid out fully in
all relevant respects with fertilization, at the time that the full complement of
chromosomes comes together from the two parents. This mistake is serious, since
development actually occurs gradually, depends from the beginning on the
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environmental context and on cell-cell interaction to guide and inform the
process, and is an epigenetic process that unfolds over time as the complex
system develops.
To help address problematic genetic determinist views and to understand
why they are problematic, this Article provides an historical look at the evolution
of ideas of development. Rather than progressing through a recitation of
chronology, however, the approach focuses on several clusters of contributions.
Part I examines cloning and demonstrates what was meant by cloning, why the
research developed, and with what results. Then came excitement about cloning
combined with hopes for stem cell research for producing therapies-all in the
context of genetic determinism. In Part II, I turn to issues of underlying
assumptions and how they affect our understanding of life. In particular, genetic
determinism and the assumption that development and differentiation occur in
only one irreversible direction have caused problems. Part III looks in more
detail at stem cell research as an alternative to genetic determinism and brings us
to the nature of developmental science and who should count as an expert in this
field. Finally, I present my conclusions.
I. EARLY CLONING RESEARCH
My first embryology course in graduate school was at Indiana University
with Robert Briggs. Working with Thomas King in the early 1950s, Briggs had
carried out the first successful cloning by nuclear transfer, which he performed
using frogs.' King and Briggs transferred the nucleus from very early embryo
stages of one species into the egg of another species and observed that the
resulting frog was more like the donor than the host.
Researchers, especially John Gurdon, carried this nuclear transplantation
technique further, even using cells from later stage embryos. Gurdon's frogs
appeared on magazine covers, a large dark colored female and the small albino
males, suggesting that the nucleus of the donor prevails at least in these visible
respects over the influence of the host egg.' Gurdon had success with nuclei from
somewhat later stages, reporting that about 30% of the nuclei transferred from
blastula stages produced tadpoles, while 6% of nuclei taken from hatched
tadpoles and only 3% from the even later stage of swimming tadpoles could
produce successful clones that themselves developed to the tadpole stage.3 This
may seem like a small percentage, but note that Briggs and King had not had
success with any later stage nuclei and had concluded that cloning is difficult and
1. Robert Briggs & Thomas J. King, Transplantation of Living Nuclei from Blastula Cells
into EnucleatedFrogs'Eggs, 38 PROC. NAT'L ACAD. Sci. 455 (1952).
2. See, e.g., Anne McLaren, Cloning: Pathways to a Pluripotent Future, 288 SCIENCE 1775
(2000).
3. Id. at 1776.
IX:2 (2009)
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that cloning from the late stages was not possible.4 By the 1960s, "cloning" in
this sense, by nuclear transfer, was a well-established research technique,
allowing transfer of a nucleus from one individual to another in order to test the
relative contributions of donor and host, and in order to assess the ability of the
experimental system to respond to changing conditions.
As I began to do research with Briggs, he talked about this research into
cloning. Why, he asked, was there so little public interest in the possibilities for
cloning, perhaps even for reproductive reasons? He pointed to old magazines that
showed a brief public attention to the experimentally produced hybrid frogs, but
noted that publicity had declined quickly. Briggs felt that any cloning for
reproductive reasons would surely raise ethical questions about what sorts of
things scientists ought to do. He did not dismiss the possibility that nuclear
transfer might be possible with human eggs, since he did not make the
assumption as many researchers did that mammals (including humans) were too
complex for nuclear transfer to be successful. Nor did he assume that any frog
resulting from nuclear transfer would be like the donor nucleus rather than like
the host embryo, since he was not a nuclear (or genetic) determinist. Instead he
taught that developing embryos were highly responsive to their environments and
that we knew little about the details of development. He was an embryologist
who understood the complexities of the embryo and its ability to respond and
adapt to changing environmental conditions. Briggs understood that, in science
generally, we should expect the unexpected and keep exploring the range of what
is possible; we must retain open minds about what science can achieve.
Briggs also noted that he and King had not been the first to imagine animal
cloning through nuclear transfer. Embryologist Hans Spemann had raised the
idea in 1938 in his Silliman Lectures presented at Yale. He had suggested a
"fantastical" experiment 5 that he did not think should be terribly technically
difficult. Spemann was thinking of frogs, which have large eggs that are plentiful
and easy to work with. Already Spemann could transplant parts of different
embryos and watch the resulting hybrid grow. Therefore, why not carry the
transplantation one step further and transplant not just limbs and eye sockets but
also a nucleus? He imagined that it would be possible to take a nucleus from one
egg or embryo and transfer it to another that had had its embryo removed.
Spemann never carried out his proposed experiment, but Briggs, King, and
Gurdon did.
James Watson and colleagues may have had a typical geneticist's skepticism
about the significance of animal cloning in their 1983 textbook, Recombinant
DNA: A Short Course. Describing nuclear transfer in animals such as frogs in
early developmental stages, they wrote, "In the immediate future there is little
4. Id. See generally J.B. Gurdon & Alan Colman, The Future of Cloning, 402 NATURE 743
(1999) (reflecting on early cloning research).
5. HANS SPEMANN, EMBRYONIC DEVELOPMENT AND INDUCTION 211 (1938).
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likelihood of nuclear transplantation being attempted with any other mammalian
species." They also noted, "If the efficiency and reproducibility can be improved,
the method may, however, find a place in animal breeding. In theory it could be
attempted with human eggs and embryonic cells, but for what reason? There is
no practical application.",
6
No practical application for cloning? At the time, that conclusion could well
have seemed sensible to geneticists not particularly interested in development or
in frogs. Yet embryologists surely thought otherwise, since there was much
interest in tools that could help us understand the developmental stages and the
processes of morphogenesis and differentiation that take place gradually over
time. Cloning in the sense of embryonic nuclear transfer, in fact, has proven itself
useful as one such tool, and 1997 brought cloning to the public's attention.
In that year, Ian Wilmut and his team announced that they had cloned Dolly
the sheep using nuclear transfer. This was the same basic technique that Briggs
and King had pioneered, except that Wilmut and his team used adult somatic
cells for the donor nuclei instead of nuclei from early developmental stages.
Wilmut did not start with Briggs's and King's assumption that later stage nuclei
would be too far differentiated and therefore a mismatch for the egg.7 In fact, the
many biologists who had made that standard assumption were shocked that
Wilmut's laboratory's technique worked. Princeton Professor of Microbiology
Lee Silver commented to New York Times reporter Gina Kolata that he had just
completed a book claiming that such somatic cell nuclear transfer was
impossible. As Gina Kolata reported, "'It's unbelievable,"' Dr. Silver said. "'It
basically means that there are no limits. It means all of science fiction is true.
They said it could never be done and now here it is, done before the year
2000.'"8 Obviously, he was forced to revise the book that he had just been ready
to send to press. 9
Wilmut's group showed that cloning was indeed possible with adult
mammals. Additionally, they showed that cloning had a practical application,
namely in agriculture. Why not try to duplicate a cow that produces especially
large quantities of milk? Why not replicate the cattle with the best beef, the
fastest thoroughbreds, or the best-laying chickens? Agriculture had many uses for
6. JAMES D. WATSON, JOHN ToOZE & DAVID T. JURTZ, RECOMBINANT DNA: A SHORT COURSE
207-08 (1983).
7. For discussion of these discoveries, see IAN WILMUT, KEITH CAMPBELL & COLIN TUDGE,
THE SECOND CREATION: DOLLY AND THE AGE OF BIOLOGICAL CONTROL (2000). Ian Wilmut later
explained that his colleague Keith Campbell was the leader on the project and that others in the
team also contributed in important ways.
8. Gina Kolata, Scientist Reports First Cloning Ever of Adult Mammal, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 23,
1997, at Al.
9. See LEE M. SILVER, REMAKING EDEN: CLONING AND BEYOND IN A BRAVE NEW WORLD
(1997); Kolata, supra note 8.
IX:2 (2009)
4
Yale Journal of Health Policy, Law, and Ethics, Vol. 9 [2009], Iss. 3, Art. 6
https://digitalcommons.law.yale.edu/yjhple/vol9/iss3/6
THE CONTEXT OF GENETIC DETERMINISM
somatic cell nuclear transfer. Some also saw the potential for the cloning of
endangered species, at least for those where natural habitat still existed to allow
benefit from a breeding program.
Of course, cloning adult humans is another matter. There was a strong public
reaction against the idea of genetic copying or the prospects for what Gina Kolata
imagined and many others echoed as a "time-delayed twin."' 0 Few were troubled
by the ethics of cloning sheep or cows, and some found the idea of cloning a
favorite pet appealing. It was the prospect of human or other mammalian
reproductive cloning that led to widespread debate all across the globe. Despite
some initial curiosity and some rogue interests in individuals imagining cloning
themselves, a strong consensus emerged by the end of 1997 among scientists that
there was little reason for cloning humans for reproductive reasons. '1 Too many
risks, too many unknowns, and too few justifications were already leading to a
dominant view that this was one area of science that we should not carry out. We
should not want to, nor need to clone human beings.
This conclusion, reinforced by all the well-funded bioethics discussions of
the previous decade about the Human Genome Project, was that cloning involved
genetic duplication, that genetics defined an individual's life, and that therefore a
genetic duplication of persons would be morally and pragmatically unacceptable.
Some felt that legislation prohibiting human reproductive cloning was warranted
or perhaps that the 1974 National Research Act governing human subjects
research already prohibited such experimentation. 12 Some hoped that the moral
force of public opinion against cloning would prevail. With no compelling
interests in human cloning, it seemed in 1997 that it was just a matter of working
out details for prohibiting human cloning, ideally internationally.
This turned out to be not so easy, in large part because of the successes of
stem cell research. We need to look at that work that began in 1998, when we
learned about human embryonic stem cell research for the first time through the
10. Kolata, supra note 8.
11. See, e.g., NAT'L BIOETHICS ADVISORY COMM'N, CLONING HUMAN BEINGS (1997), available
at http://bioethics.georgetown.edu/nbac/pubs/cloningl/cloning.pdf ("It seems clear to all of us . . .
that any attempt to clone human beings ... is unacceptably dangerous to the fetus and, therefore,
morally unacceptable.); Andy Coghlan, Cloning Report Leaves Loophole, NEW SCIENTIST, June 14,
1997, at 77 (summarizing the conclusions of the National Bioethics Advisory Commission and
noting the panel agreed that human cloning presented "unacceptable risks"); CNN Interactive,
Scientist: Human Cloning 'Need Not Happen,' http://www.cnn.com/TECH/9703/12/cloning.news/
index.html (last visited Apr. 21, 2009) (quoting Ian Wilmut saying in 1997 that human cloning
"need not happen, and I hope it will not").
12. National Research Act, Pub. L. No. 93-348, § 201, 88 Stat. 348 (1974) (codified as
amended in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.) (establishing the National Commission for the
Protection of Human Subjects of Biomedical and Behavioral Research, which later promulgated
regulations for human subjects research (codified at 45 C.F.R. § 46 (2009))).
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work of James Thomson and John Gearhart. Research had been underway for
decades on mice, but the public had generally remained ignorant about stem
cells. Thomson and Gearhart showed that the research on mice could now be
extended to humans, and thus, they raised the possibility that stem cell lines
might prove of therapeutic use,' 3 even if not for purposes of reproducing
"copies" of the cloned donor animal.
Thomson's work on human embryonic stem cells and Gearhart's work on
human embryonic germ cells was announced against the background of heated
discussions about cloning. Immediately and repeatedly, television and print news
coverage combined the two. What did stem cell research mean for cloning, and
what did research cloning mean for stem cell applications? After all, both are
about embryos. The two lines of research were, naturally enough, conflated in the
public mind. Those who had decided for whatever reasons that they hated the
very idea of cloning immediately also hated stem cell research. Those intrigued
by the scientific possibilities for cloning saw even greater prospects in combining
the two. The neologism "therapeutic cloning" was created to describe cloning-
for-research-purposes-only in order to separate it from "reproductive cloning,"
which would aim to produce babies. With so-called therapeutic cloning came the
hope that the public imagination could be captured by the "therapeutic"
opportunities rather than by the lingering negative of imagined duplicated
humans. 1 Developmental biologists never lost sight of the research value in
cloning, but they did lose control over the use of the technical term. The
geneticist Lee Silver, for example, reported that a television producer had told
him in 1998: "'Dr. Silver, you are not aware of what cloning can accomplish.
Clones are not what you think they are."' 15
Stem cell research may have great potential application. Yet it has also led
people to fall back on assumptions of genetic determinism and cloning.
Geneticists have thought in terms of hereditary determinism, whereas stem cell
researchers and developmental biologists have worked from assumptions of
developmental plasticity, or the idea that it is the process of development in the
context of changing environments that shapes the resulting organism along with
the original inherited information. This idea of developmental plasticity is critical
for stem cell research, which involves being able to direct undifferentiated stem
cells to become different kinds of cells, depending on the environment of their
13. See, e.g., John Gearhart, New Potential for Human Embryonic Stem Cells, 282 SCIENCE
1061 (1998); Michael J. Shamblott et al., Derivation of Pluripotent Stem Cells from Cultured
Human Primordial Germ Cells, 95 PROC. NAT'L ACAD. SCI. 13,726 (1998); James A. Thomson et
al., Embryonic Stem Cell Lines Derived from Human Blastocysts, 282 SCIENCE 1145 (1998).
14. See, e.g., David Magnus & Mildred K. Cho, Issues in Oocyte Donation for Stem Cell
Research, 308 SCIENCE 1747, 1747-48 (2005).
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culture medium. Yet assumptions of genetic determinism had come so
overwhelmingly to dominate biology, and public impressions of life, that even
fundamental work in areas of what had earlier been called embryology, such as
the work by Briggs, King, and Spemann, was largely ignored.
In fact, those working in the embryological tradition had always realized that
embryos retained a great deal of developmental plasticity and that they can
respond and "regulate" within their changing environmental conditions. These
researchers had continued to ask fundamental questions about differentiation and
morphogenesis. They also recognized the special properties of stem cells to
produce "immortal" undifferentiated cell lines while also being able to become
differentiated under the right conditions. This is the idea of pluripotent stem
cells: that under some conditions in the laboratory dish they can self-replicate
forever (or so it is assumed), and with different culture media they can be made
to become specific different kinds of differentiated cells (and have plural
potential).
While some of these embryological scientists continued with their
developmental studies, by the 1970s many researchers had followed the lure of
genetics and molecular biology and set aside the complex system of cellular
interactions that make up embryology. The Human Genome Project had so tipped
the public perception, and some might argue even the actual practice, of biology
that geneticists seemed to be able to serve as the experts for all matters of living
organisms. Reporters turned to the familiar geneticists like Nobel Prize winner
James Watson or familiar bioethicists, who had been enticed by the NIH's
Ethical, Legal, and Social Implications (ELSI) genomics program to focus on
genetics, as the appropriate "talking head" experts to help interpret stem cell
science. 16 In fact, however, many of those researchers knew far less about the
details of early development than developmental biologists would have, and their
lack of expertise sometimes led to misinformation and confusion. Naturally
enough, when scientists seemed to be contradicting each other or even correcting
themselves, the appearance of professional confusion led to public annoyance
and distrust. Why should the public, members of Congress, or reporters trust
scientists who could not agree? It has taken some time for developmental
biologists to emerge as legitimate authorities and experts in developmental
biology and to help interpret the complexities of the developing organic systems.
To understand this particular situation more clearly, and also to look
forward wisely, it will help to understand a bit more history. In particular, we
need to appreciate the impact of underlying assumptions both in the scientific
research and among the public, and why these assumptions matter. It matters
greatly that genetic determinism came to dominate biology as well as the public
16. For example, Gina Kolata, in first breaking the cloning story for the New York Times,
turned to geneticist and molecular biologist Lee Silver rather than a developmental biologist to
explain the events. See Kolata, supra note 8.
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perception of life. And it matters greatly that with genetic determinism has come
an assumption that development is a matter of progressive differentiation caused
by genes and expressed in the proper genetically-regulated sequence.
II. FUNDAMENTAL ASSUMPTIONS: GENETIC DETERMINISM AND
UNIDIRECTIONAL DIFFERENTIATION
Where direct knowledge is impossible, biologists necessarily start working
from assumptions. It is important to articulate and understand the impact of those
assumptions, insofar as that is possible. Sometimes the assumptions become so
widespread and well-established that it is difficult to get outside what Thomas
Kuhn called the basic working assumptions of a paradigm. 17 Yet it is valuable to
try. This section examines genetic determinism and unidirectional differentiation,
two such assumptions in stem cell research. This section also discusses the
difference between genetic determinism, the approach that primarily emphasizes
the role of genes in development, and epigenesis which emphasizes the ways that
cells may develop in response to contextual factors independent of inherited
genes.
Since the early twentieth century, it has become commonplace to assume
that each individual organism begins with inherited genes, located in the nucleus
and organized along chromosomes. The genes, it seems, carry the information, or
code, for the resulting characteristics of the organism. Development follows, with
the cells in each developmental stage expressing (or becoming differentiated
according to the instructions of) the appropriate piece of information
programmed in the genetic code. The dominant assumptions of twentieth-century
biology, therefore, included genetic determinism and the idea that differentiation
occurs in one direction only, following the genetic program.
In the early twentieth century, hereditarians who held that characters are
determined by their heredity (through genetics) led to an enthusiasm for eugenics
as an effective approach to solving the perceived public health problem of a
contaminated gene pool. Fortunately it became clear that we really knew little
about inheritance, and the ill-advised eugenics programs mostly declined. 18 By
mid-century, however, James Watson and Francis Crick's discovery of DNA
structure quickly made it clear that "it has not escaped our notice that the specific
pairing" of the nucleotides that make up DNA "immediately suggests a possible
copying mechanism for the genetic material."' 19 Heredity drives development, it
seemed, and "defective" genes could be a new target for elimination, which many
17. THOMAS S. KUHN, THE STRUCTURE OF SCIENTIFIC REVOLUTIONS 23 (1962).
18. For an excellent overview, see DIANE B. PAUL, CONTROLLING HUMAN HEREDITY: 1865 TO
THE PRESENT (1995).
19. J.D. Watson & F.H.C. Crick, Molecular Structure of Nucleic Acids: A Structure for
Deoxyribose Nucleic Acid, 171 NATURE 737, 737 (1953).
IX:2 (2009)
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critics considered a new form of eugenics.20
With these assumptions in place, genetics became the backbone for teaching
biology. The traditional problems of embryology, differentiation, and
morphogenesis largely gave way to primacy for problems of molecules, genes,
and cell biology. Of course, some researchers continued their studies of
developmental patterns, including studies of stem cells: it has remained a core
goal of biology to understand how, once we have particular genes, they are
actually expressed. Most public attention remains focused on news about genetic
correlations with diseases or hopes for genetically-based personalized medicine.
Molecular and cell biology programs are widely recognized as having
proliferated in academic institutions, but they often require little understanding of
the processes by which cells differentiate over time or of relationships among
cells, organisms, and species. The implication of this investment is that if only
we knew the human genome sequence, then we could solve medical problems.
The Human Genome Project was certainly justified, given the availability of
techniques for studying genetics and then genomics. But the single-minded focus
on genetic determinism has had consequences.
The second fundamental assumption-the inevitability of unidirectional
differentiation-is reinforced by the assumption of genetic determinism. When
we watch a fertilized egg develop through each successive stage, it is natural to
see it as becoming more differentiated. It is not unreasonable to see the process
of increasing differentiation as determined by some internal driver (the genes are
today's choice, even though earlier generations tried invoking internal gradients
and other chemical factors). And it is also reasonable to see the process as
unidirectional. Once cells and body parts are appropriately differentiated, the
natural assumption is that they stay differentiated. That is what we seem to see
under normal conditions, and it is reasonable to assume that that is the way
differentiation works. Why would differentiation be other than in the progressive
and forward direction of increasing cell specialization and organismal
complexity?
Yet in the absence of all the data we have today, the late nineteenth and early
twentieth century biologists experienced great disagreement about this point.
Some researchers such as August Weismann and Wilhelm Roux were strong
hereditary determinists, but theirs was the minority position. 21 Weismann and
Roux believed that the individual inherited its germ plasm from both parents, and
the hypothetical units (called determinants by Weismann) that made up the
nuclear chromosomes were then divided into the different cells during cell
division. They hypothesized that the determinants were actually parceled out,
20. See, e.g., THE CODE OF CODES: SCIENTIFIC AND SOCIAL ISSUES IN THE HUMAN GENOME
PROJECT (Daniel J. Kevles & Leroy Hood eds., 1992); ROBERT COOK-DEEGAN, THE GENE WARS:
SCIENCE, POLITICS AND THE HUMAN GENOME (1994).
21. JANE MAIENSCHEIN, WHOSE VIEW OF LIFE 72-74 (2003).
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yielding a mosaic of different cells. Even when it became clear that the complete
chromosomal complement remained whole in each cell, however, they just
invoked a selective expression of different determinants in each cell. Their
overarching view was, in effect, consistent with genetic theory today.
But others-indeed the vast majority of embryologists and histologists (as
cell biologists were called then)-complained that Weismann and Roux provided
no explanation of development at all.22 These researchers saw complexities,
responses to changing environmental conditions, and interactions among cells
and parts. Development was not predetermined by inheritance, they concluded,
but was a gradual response of the integrated and interactive whole organism to its
changing environment. As Edmund Beecher Wilson acknowledged in the title of
his classic, The Cell in Development and Inheritance, an organism needs both
that which is inherited-the germ cells with their nuclear chromosomes-and the
capacity to respond to the particular conditions.23 For these biologists,
development was an epigenetic process and not a matter of preformationism or
even the sort of internal predeterminism that Weismann and Roux offered. They
explicitly and repeatedly rejected such a hereditarian account as hypothetical, not
grounded in evidence, and as too simplistic to explain the complexities of
development and differentiation.24
This has been a core debate about the nature of life reaching back to
Aristotle. William Morton Wheeler summarized debates about Weismann's ideas
in 1899 by suggesting that there are two different kinds of thinkers. Some see
change and process, while others see stability. Heraclitus, Aristotle, physiology,
and epigenesis characterize one way of looking at the world; Parmenides, Plato,
morphology, and preformationism characterize the other. These are, Wheeler felt,
stable and persistent classes, and yet the nature and details of their differences
have changed over time. Wheeler argued that by the end of the nineteenth
century neither a strict preformationist nor a strict epigeneticist who ignored new
evidence and new reasoning could succeed. In the end, it is not to philosophy but
to science that we must look to resolve the relative contributions of hereditary
pre-determinism and regulatory development, for "[b]oth tendencies will find
their correctives in investigation.
' 25
Today, we are in a similar situation except that the preformism of genetic
determinism has overbalanced our understanding of complex developmental
22. For a summary, see EDMUND BEECHER WILSON, THE CELL IN DEVELOPMENT AND
INHERITANCE 303-31 (Ist ed. 1896).
23. EDMUND BEECHER WILSON, THE CELL IN DEVELOPMENT AND INHERITANCE (2d ed. 1900).
This volume was later retitled. THE CELL IN HEREDITY AND DEVELOPMENT (3d ed. 1925).
24. For discussion, see JANE MAIENSCHEIN, TRANSFORMING TRADITIONS IN AMERICAN
BIOLOGY, 1890-1915 (1991).
25. William Morton Wheeler, Caspar Friedrich Wolff and the Theoria Generationis, in
DEFINING BIOLOGY: LECTURES FROM THE 1890s, at 195, 216 (Jane Maienschein ed., 1986).
IX:2 (2009)
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processes. We have forgotten Wheeler's plea for a balanced view. We have
forgetten that when Hans Driesch shook apart the first two cells of the sea urchin
egg, they did not result in two half embryos, as Roux had predicted, but instead
in two smaller larval urchins.26 We have forgotten the extensive work that
Thomas Hunt Morgan did on regeneration of a large number of different animals,
showing the extent of developmental plasticity. 27 We have even forgotten the
work of John Tyler Bonner on morphogenesis and the relations of parts in the
developing interacting organism. 28 These studies show the capacity of the
individual to regulate its development in the context of environmental change,
even with experimental assaults like shaking apart the first two cells or chopping
up the embryo into bits of organism like earthworms to watch them regenerate
into two new worms.
Biologists have also forgotten the early work on stem cells and their
developmental plasticity. It is worth reminding ourselves of this work, if only to
help illuminate the power of the underlying assumptions. If biologists had had
these earlier studies more clearly in mind, or if reporters had called on experts
who knew this developmental research rather than appealing mainly to
geneticists, the public might not have been so shocked by the cloning and stem
cell discoveries of the late 1990s. They might even have been able to forestall the
preformationist conclusions that fit so tidily with ultra-conservative religious
assumption that life begins absolutely at the moment of fertilization or
"conception"--the moment of genetic union-even though the now-fertilized
egg remains completely undifferentiated and unformed.29
This is the key point: the biology that we have actively and visibly promoted
(and with which the public is most familiar) is a biology that relies heavily on
predeterminism. Until the public appearance of human stem cell lines, we did not
see the biology of epigenetic development or the sort of moderated balance that
Wheeler called for over a century ago. If some scientists claim that each
organism begins with inheritance of genes, with development simply expressing
the genetically preprogrammed sequence of steps, it is difficult to explain the
complexities of developmental processes to those in the public who insist as a
matter of faith that "life begins at conception." It is ironic that those who most
vehemently insist that they are "pro-life" in all its forms are those adopting a
biological determinism and denying the "free will" of developmental plasticity of
26. Hans Driesch, Entwicklungsmechanische Studien. I. Der Werth der beiden ersten
Furchungszellen in der Echinodermentwicklung. Experimentelle Erzeugen von Theil- und
Doppelbildung, 53 ZEITSCHRIFT FOR WISSENSCHAFTLICHE ZOOLOGIE 160-78 (1892), translated in
FOUNDATIONS OF EXPERIMENTAL EMBRYOLOGY 38-50 (Benjamin Willier & Jane M. Oppenheimer
eds., 1964).
27. See THOMAS HUNT MORGAN, REGENERATION (1901).
28. See JOHN TYLER BONNER, MORPHOGENESIS (1952).
29. MAIENSCHEIN, supra note 21, at 3.
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the individual. This view of genetically determined life is probably not, in fact,
what they have in mind. We must make this point clear in order to gain wise
traction on the problem of competing entrenched views. To understand the
alternatives, let us look briefly at the history of stem cell science.
III. STEM CELL HISTORY: AN EPIGENETIC ALTERNATIVE
Like cloning, stem cell research did not suddenly begin out of nothing in
1998. In fact, also like the term "cloning," the term "stem cell" was first used in
the late nineteenth century. Both concepts began in botany where cloning meant
production of identical individual plants. Stem cells referred to undifferentiated
cells that retained their undifferentiated state. Edmund Beecher Wilson and his
friend and collaborator William Sedgwick were the first ones to use the term in
the late 1800s. 30 They did not, of course, know about the range of different types
of stem cells that we have identified since, nor did they culture stem cell lines or
look at mammalian cells. Yet they identified the original concept, and other
research in embryology and cytology later confirmed that some cells retain
flexibility and the ability to respond to environmental conditions.
Ross Granville Harrison, working first at Johns Hopkins and then at Yale,
carried out the first successful tissue culture experiment, which was also the first
stem cell experiment. 31 He did not label the neuroblasts (embryonic cells that
give rise to neural cells) that he cultured "stem cells," nor did he develop a stem
cell line or any of the other key elements we use today to define the cells. In
retrospect, however, this was the first stem cell experiment, using cells that we
recognize as neural stem cells and carrying out the first ever cell and tissue
culture.
Harrison asked a core embryological question: how does a cell differentiate?
In particular, he wanted to shed light on the heated contemporary debate about
the nervous system. The question was, how do individual cells "know" where to
go? Do they follow predetermined paths that are laid down in the developing
embryo? Or, in contrast to this preformationist view, could the process be
epigenetic? That is, might the cells develop independently, each following its
own internal direction to a point but taking its cues from the surrounding
environment? In this case, was it the interactions of the whole organism that
influence how each cell develops? Preformation or epigenesis: this was the old
question in a new form.
30. See, e.g., 16 OxFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY 627 (2d ed. 1989) (defining "stem" and noting
early references to the term "stem cell," including an 1896 reference from E.B. Wilson that
distinguishes stem cells from somatic cells) (quoting WILSON, supra note 22, at 111). For further
discussion, see Jane Maienschein, What's in a Name: Embryos, Clones, and Stem Cells, 2 Am. J.
BIOETHICS 12 (2002).
31. MAIENSCHEIN, supra note 24, at 261-89.
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Harrison followed the same reasoning as Spemann, looking to discover the
results of transplanting cells. Instead of transplanting such parts as limbs from
one embryo to another, which is what researchers had done in the past, and
instead of transplanting the nucleus as Spemann had suggested, Harrison
proposed to go further. Why not actually explant the cells? Just take them out of
the body altogether. Might it not be possible to take those cells known to give
rise to the nerve fibers (the neuroblasts), remove them from their normal
surroundings, place them into a culture medium, and see what they will do? If
they behave more or less normally, this would suggest that they follow an
epigenetic interaction with their environment as they grow under normal
conditions, as in the experimental case. Harrison concluded that the nature of the
processes was fundamentally the same and that more research was needed to
discover the other factors involved. This experiment was not easy, and Harrison
first had to develop a culture medium on which the cells could grow. Fortunately,
he moved to Yale in 1907 and was temporarily housed near the bacteriologists.
They taught him about aseptic conditions, and his technique improved
dramatically.32
Harrison decided that he had obtained what he wanted from the experiment,
namely another piece of evidence about the epigenetic nature of development. He
did not pursue tissue culture further because he was interested in different
questions that called for different methods. Yet others did take up the approach,
notably Alexis Carrel at the Rockefeller University. 33 He and other tissue culture
researchers set down the foundations for later stem cell research, establishing
techniques for successful cell culture and demonstrating the considerable
plasticity and ability to respond to surrounding conditions of many types of cells
and tissues.
That was a foundation, but it was the work on hematopoeitic stem cells that
started serious interest in human stem cells and their potential applications.
Already in the eighteenth century, some adventurous experimenters had
apparently carried out animal to human blood transfusions, though the earliest
rumors are not well documented. In 1795, Philip Syng Physick reported having
transfused blood from one human to another for the first time. This broke down
any assumption that humans were entirely unique and instead showed a common
physiology. In the twentieth century, blood transfusions became routine as
researchers worked out ways to control immune responses, to recognize and
match blood types, and to prevent clotting.34 Yet despite this great advance,
32. See Ross Granville Harrison, The Outgrowth of the Nerve Fiber as a Mode of Protoplasmic
Movement, 9 J. EXPERIMENTAL ZOOLOGY 787 (1910).
33. See CREATING A TRADITION OF BIOMEDICAL RESEARCH: CONTRIBUTIONS TO THE HISTORY OF
THE ROCKEFELLER UNIVERSITY 135-50 (Darwin H. Stapleton ed., 2004).
34. For the well-known history of blood transfusion, see SUSAN E. LEDERER, FLESH AND
BLOOD: ORGAN TRANSPLANTATION AND BLOOD TRANSFUSION IN TWENTIETH-CENTURY AMERICA
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transferring blood from one person to another cannot solve all problems, and it
always carries risks, including potential rejection or infection.
Discovery is sometimes stimulated by crisis. In France in the 1950s, a
serious radiation accident produced a number of victims with various forms of
leukemia, a blood disease. 35 It was already known that blood cells arose in the
bone marrow, apparently from hematopoeitic stem cells. A flurry of research
prompted by the French crisis led to discovery of the human leukocyte antigen
that allowed the individual's body to distinguish between itself and other foreign
cells and to initiate the body's effort to destroy the foreign invaders. How could
medical science override the protective systems? By the 1960s, researchers
conducted the first transplantation of bone marrow into a child with
immunodeficiency disease, and the first marrow transplants on an unrelated
patient occurred in 1973.36
While these human success stories were remarkable, the major study of stem
cells and their possibilities remained focused on mice. Mice are relatively easy to
study, available from supply houses in genetically controlled lineages, and
enough like humans to be a better model system than fruit flies, frogs, or
nematode worms. In the 1970s Leroy Stevens was already following up earlier
studies of abnormal developmental results such as teratomas. What caused such
disorganized masses of "monstrous" cells in the mouse, he asked? If we could
understand the cause of teratogenesis, we might begin to understand the causes of
cancers and also the causes of normal differentiation.37 During the next decades,
many more researchers in a number of different labs took up mouse embryology,
including a focus on the patterns of differentiation of embryonic stem cells.
Until the 1990s, the potential human applications of knowledge derived from
mouse studies remained unclear. Embryonic stem cells were fascinating precisely
because their fates were unknown and because they, in theory, had the capacity
to differentiate into any and every separate kind of cell (though not necessarily in
any organized way, and therefore, they are not totipotent and cannot become the
whole). Yet because of this, they also could produce a tangle of wildly
differentiated cells. Teratomas were common, for example, yielding a mix of
teeth, hair, and other differentiated cells all jumbled together. Therefore, simply
transplanting embryonic stem cells might well have yielded a muddle of cells
(2008); PBS, Red Gold: 1700-1919 Discovery and Exploration, http://www.pbs.org/wnet/redgold/
history/timeline3.html (last visited Apr. 21, 2009).
35. MAIENSCHEIN, supra note 21, at 252.
36. See, e.g., Cynthia M. Piccolo, Transplant Timeline - Bone Marrow Transplants,
http://www.medhunters.com/articles/transplantTimelineBMT.html (last visited Apr. 21, 2009)
(providing a history of bone marrow transplants).
37. See R. Lewis, A Stem Cell Legacy: Leroy Stevens, 14 SCIENTIST 19 (2000); cf L.C.
Stevens, Teratogenesis and Spontaneous Parthenogenesis in Mice, in THE DEVELOPMENTAL
BIOLOGY OF REPRODUCTION 93 (Clement L. Markert & John Papaconstantinou eds., 1975).
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rather than anything medically useful. Researchers were well aware of these
limitations, and yet some persisted in developing embryonic stem cell lines in the
hope that they would help us learn more about the nature of differentiation, and
also because there was always the possibility that we could learn to engineer
these cells to do what we wanted and to make them predictable.38
This drive to understand and control differentiation is a basic foundation of
medicine and applied biology. It is not new. As historian Philip Pauly brilliantly
showed, in the late 1890s Jacques Loeb was already promoting a "mechanistic
conception of life.",39 Loeb produced parthenogenetic (asexual) sea urchins, eggs
that divided and differentiated up to the pluteus larval stage. Loeb accidentally
discovered that by changing the concentration of salt in the sea water, he could
produce female sea urchins that did not need males to reproduce. The front pages
of newspapers announced, "Science Nears the Secret of Life.",40 If fertilization
was not even necessary, and eggs could develop on their own, then females could
produce their own offspring.
That was in 1899. The assumption was that with proper knowledge and
techniques, scientists could control and engineer life processes. Today, scientists
including Robert Lanza of Advanced Cell Technology reflect the same
thinking.4 1 So do many of the scientists who led the advocacy march for funding
for stem cell research in California and other states. If only we had money, they
reasoned, we could take stem cell lines like those James Thomson produced in
1998, and we could get them to do what we want them to do. Then, since they
would be differentiated according to our direction, we might assume that once a
cell becomes a heart muscle (or brain or pancreas or whatever it is that we want)
it will stay that sort of cell and function the way it is supposed to.
There is something exciting and high-minded about this view. In 1909,
Loeb's success brought considerable excitement and heavy financial support
from the Rockefeller Institute.42 There was great hope for medical progress. And
so we think today. But we should also be wiser now, over a century later. If we
38. See, e.g., M J. Evans & M.H. Kaufman, Establishment in Culture of Pluripotential Cells
from Mouse Embryos, 292 NATURE 154 (1981); Gail R. Martin, Isolation of a Pluripotent Cell Line
from Early Mouse Embryos Cultured in Medium Conditioned by Teratocarcinoma Stem Cells, 78
PROC. NAT'L ACAD. SCI. 7634 (1981).
39. PHILIP PAULY, CONTROLLING LIFE: JACQUES LOEB & THE ENGINEERING IDEAL IN BIOLOGY
130 (1987) (quoting PAUL DE KRUIF, THE SWEEPING WIND: A MEMOIR 42 (1962)); id. at 100. On
this point, see Jane Maienschein, Controlling Life: From Jacques Loeb to Regenerative Medicine,
J. HIST. BIOLOGY (forthcoming 2009).
40. See PAULY, supra note 39, at 218 n.31 (citing Science Nears the Secret of Life, CHI.
SUNDAY TRIB., Nov. 19, 1899, at 33); id at 100-02.
41. See Advanced Cell Technology, Fact Sheet, http://www.advancedcell.com/fact-sheet (last
visited Apr. 21, 2009).
42. See PAULY, supra note 39, at 135-36.
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are selecting cells precisely because they are pluripotent and capable of diverse
differentiation, then assuming that we can cause them to differentiate exactly as
they would normally involves assumptions more simplistic than those Ross
Harrison made a century ago. Also, we are discovering with cloning and other
related research that differentiation is not unidirectional. Indeed, some of the
leading stem cell researchers talk freely about "resetting the developmental
clock," "reprogramming," or "de-differentiating" cells. 43 Recently, several
different laboratories have de-differentiated cells and reprogrammed them to act
as if they were pluripotent stem cells.44 If we can de-differentiate cells, then why
do we assume that our engineering process will produce cell lines that, even once
properly differentiated, will stay differentiated and continue to do what we want
them to do?
Many questions remain, and they are wonderfully exciting questions that
strike at the very heart of how development works. Researchers around the world
are sharing some of their results (when not restricted by the intellectual property
demands of private funding) and are benefiting from a major infusion of funding
and attention to stem cell science as through the California Initiative funding. 5
What history shows us is that what we actually come to know and what we are
able to do may be very different from what we expect. It may well turn out that
pluripotent embryonic stem cell lines are useful for research now, but that what
we really need are multipotent or unipotent precursor cells that are already partly
differentiated. Perhaps these cells will be more likely to stay differentiated in the
desired way once they are transplanted for use. We may come to appreciate the
complexity of developmental responses to changing environmental conditions,
tempering our genetic determinism with the gradual, epigenetic, development of
differentiation and morphogenesis. Perhaps we can even learn that life is both
more complex than simplistic genetic determinist views might have it, and more
comprehensible and manageable than extreme epigenetic assumptions of
complexity would demand. Just as Wheeler suggested over a century ago,
wisdom may lie in seeking a middle ground, arriving at understanding not
through philosophy and assumptions but through scientific exploration and
evidence.4 6
43. See, e.g., Nicole Rusk, Resetting the Clock, 3 NATURE METHODS 72 (2006).
44. See Keisuke Okita, Tomoko Ichisaka & Shinya Yamanaka, Generation of Germline-
Competent Induced Pluripotent Stem Cells, 448 NATURE 313 (2007); Junying Yu et al., Induced
Pluripotent Stem Cell Lines Derived from Human Somatic Cells, 318 SCIENCE 1917 (2007).
45. See, e.g., California Institute for Regenerative Medicine, About CIRM,
http://www.cirm.ca.gov (last visited Apr. 21, 2009).
46. See supra note 25 and accompanying text.
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CONCLUSION
We see that it was largely because of exuberance for genetic determinism
that we were surprised by cloning and then by stem cell research. We might have
predicted these developments if we had had a more robust sense of the range of
developmental possibilities and plasticities, and ideally even a sense of the
history-both the history of science and the history of the complex developing
organism. Instead, cloning and later stem cell research have created fears and
worries about genetic duplication of persons. This fear hinges on the highly
problematic assumption that a person is nothing more than the expression of the
genetic complement.
Furthermore, public discussions have been distorted by more than the
abortion debates, the absence of scientific knowledge, and the appeal to genetics
experts as definitive sources of understanding; public debate has also been
distorted by the bioethics industry. Well-meaning academics have been strongly
supported for almost two decades by the Human Genome Project's ELSI
program at NIH to study the implications of the genome project.47 These
academics are the experts to whom reporters and commentators turned for an
ethical view of cloning and stem cell research.48 Few were familiar with the
developmental biology involved, and since they had been focused on and trained
in other, largely genetic or general medical issues, they made mistakes about the
science. Others have been exemplary in their caution, but nonetheless fall back
on analogies to genetics. This case raises questions about who the experts should
be in highly contested public discussions of science.
Surely, developmental biologists are relevant experts on the science
involved. It is entirely appropriate to ask Ian Wilmut, James Thomson, Irving
Weissman, George Daley, or Evan Snyder, for example, to explain their research.
It is entirely appropriate even to ask what they see as the implications or possible
applications, for example. It is even reasonable to ask them for their personal
interpretations of what is at issue ethically; however, then they are offering just
that--one individual's personal opinion. Bioethicists can also have individual
personal opinions as well as professional analyses. Poets or engineers or
schoolchildren may also have personal opinions, and only some are experts with
respect to any particular question. Historians of science may even have opinions,
including informed and helpful opinions. They may all have opinions about what
is at issue, about values, and about proposed social actions. It is entirely
appropriate, and indeed even necessary, that members of society individually and
society as a whole have input into decisions about social actions, even those
relating to the funding and regulation of science.
47. See National Human Genome Research Institute, ELSI Research Program,
http://www.genome.gov/10001618 (last visited Apr. 21, 2009).
48. See, e.g., COOK-DEEGAN, supra note 20.
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What is not appropriate, however, is that social commentators interpret the
science according to their own assumptions and values, and then present these
interpretations as fact. Just as it is not appropriate for scientists to decide by
themselves, on the basis of the science alone, what is moral or what ought to be
legal, so it is not appropriate for citizens to decide by themselves, on the basis of
their values alone, what scientific research is "moral," "good," or legally
defensible.
In the heated and highly polarized political climate of the late twentieth and
early twenty-first century, we have somehow allowed some particular groups to
define the important questions what counts as scientific knowledge. In particular,
the religiously-infused debates about abortion politics have been allowed to
influence the discussion about embryo research far more than is warranted by the
nature of the "expertise." Somehow, public debates about stem cell research have
become debates about whether we want to save the pre-implantation embryos
that these groups take as "persons" or whether we want to help save the lives and
improve quality of lives for those suffering from degenerative diseases. These are
the wrong questions, or at least they are not the only relevant and important
questions. Let us start by asking about the empirical facts about developing
embryos.
49
In particular, scientists show that at first an embryo in vitro is really a bunch
of undifferentiated cells in a dish.5° It would be scientifically unsound to insist
that the earliest stage fertilized egg is biologically as developed as the later-stage
fetus with all its body parts intact, including the beginnings of a beating heart and
sensory system. Neurobiologist and member of the President's Council on
Bioethics Michael Gazzaniga put it beautifully:
It is a truism that the blastocyst has the potential to be a human being. Yet at
that stage of development it is simply a clump of cells .... An analogy might
be what one sees when walking into a Home Depot. There are the parts and
potential for at least 30 homes. But if there is a fire at Home Depot, the
headline isn't 30 homes burn down. It's Home Depot burns down. 5'
Or as developmental biologist Lewis Wolpert has aptly explained, it is only with
implantation and the stages after the blastocyst that biological differentiation
starts to occur so that gastrulation (the point at which the germ layers first begin
49. See, e.g., Jane Maienschein et al., The Ethos and Ethics of Translational Research, 8 AM. J.
BIOETHICS 48-49 (2008) (noting the "rush to translation" from fundamental stem cell research to
clinical applications, which may "undercut[] [scientists'] abilities to study other kinds of
fundamental developmental processes" and paradoxically hamper the lab science necessary for
building therapeutic applications).
50. See Glenn McGee & Arthur L. Caplan, What's in the Dish?, HASTINGS CENTER REP., Mar.-
Apr. 1999, at 36.
51. Metaphor of the Week, 295 SCIENCE 1637 (2002) (quoting Michael Gazzaniga).
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to form) is "truly 'the most important event of your life.' ' 52 Embryos go through
developmental stages, as biologists have documented clearly for a century and a
half, and each of those stages has a different biological "meaning."
The earliest cell divisions are just that--divisions of material. It is as if we
were cracking a glass window into a bunch of smaller pieces, but the whole
hasn't grown any larger. It's now just a number of pieces rather than one unified
part. Yes, these are still cells and they are "living" in some sense. But without
any significant genetic action, and without any differentiation, they really do
seem biologically to be "just" cells in a dish. To suggest that these are equivalent
to a fully developed person is to devalue that person and the complex processes
that have made him or her into the individualized self that results.
Cells divide and divide up to the eight cell stage, and as far as we can tell, in
the earliest divisions there is no significant genetic action and no differentiation.
This is why the eight cells are all totipotent, each capable of becoming an
individual if separated from the rest of the cells. It is also why biologically we
can remove one or two of the eight cells (which is sometimes done in fertility
clinics for purposes of genetic testing) and the rest can still develop into a
perfectly healthy baby.
5 3
It is also why we might be able to take one or two or even up to seven cells
of the eight-cell stage and take them off to be developed to the blastocyst stage
and then harvested for stem cells. We would still have the one individual person
we would have had, without any loss of genetic information. But now we have
seven stem cell lines all genetically alike. Such an approach might address some
ethical concerns, since the one cell still becomes one individual organism with a
particular genetic makeup; but now there are also extra cell lines with the same
genetic makeup as well. Why not try it?
Developmental biologists might well ask such questions. The public might
well ask such questions. Why not try such experiments? Why have we allowed
those who are essentially genetic determinists and who insist that all stages of life
are equally important to dominate the social and political discussion; why do we
defer to those who refuse even to discuss more nuanced possibilities to define the
terms of the debate? Partly, I suspect, this is because of the nature of the
arguments about cloning, which created a focus on issues of "personhood." And
partly because of the history of bioethics as a field. Also, and perhaps most
importantly, because too many biologists themselves have been seduced by
52. LEWIS WOLPERT, TRIUMPH OF THE EMBRYO 12 (1991).
53. There is some controversy about whether such preimplantation genetic diagnosis leads to
problems or is a socially important tool. See, e.g., RUTH SCHWARTZ COWAN, HEREDITY AND HOPE:
THE CASE FOR GENETIC SCREENING (2008); Strphane Viville, Deborah Pergament & Morris
Fiddler, Ethical Perspectives and Regulation of Preimplantation Genetic Diagnostic Practice, in
PREIMPLANTATION GENETIC DIAGNOSIS 227 (Joyce C. Harper, Joy D.A. Delhanty & Alan H.
Handyside eds., 2001).
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genetic determinist thinking. They find it difficult now really to understand and
to adopt the more epigenetically balanced understanding of development and
differentiation that the science demands and from which the social needs might
well benefit.
If we are all experts in some ways on these questions, let us assume our
mantel of expertise wisely and seek to understand the full range of questions and
possible interpretations. Let us work hard to identify and also to question our
assumptions about development and its meanings. As Wheeler urged in 1899, let
us work toward wise and balanced interpretations that respect as wide a range of
views as possible without giving in to extremism on any side.54
54. See Wheeler, supra note 25, at 216.
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